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Abstract: 
Drawing on ethnographic data from the mid-2000s as well as accounts from French Jewish 
newspapers and magazines from the 1980s on, this paper traces the emergence of new French 
Jewish institutional narratives linking North African Jews to the “European” Holocaust.  I argue 
that these new narratives emerged as a response to the social and political impasses produced by 
intra-Jewish disagreements over whether and how North African Jews could talk about the 
Holocaust, disagreements that divided French Jews and threatened the relationship between 
Jewishness and French national identity.  These new narratives relied on a very different 
historicity—or way of reckoning time and causality—than those used in more divisive everyday 
French Jewish Holocaust narratives.  And by reworking the ways that French Jews reckoned 
time and causality, these pedagogical narratives offered an expansive and homogenously 
“European” Jewishness.  This argument works against a growing post-colonial sociological and 
anthropological literature on religious minorities in France and Europe by emphasizing the 
contingency, difficulty, and even ambivalence around constructing “Jewishness” as transparently 
either “European” or “French.”  In addition, it highlights the role that historicity—not just 
history—plays in producing what might count as group “identity.” 
 
In December 1997, the newly established Société d’histoire des juifs de Tunisie 
[Historical Society for Jews from Tunisia, SHJT] hosted the first French Metropolitan 
commemoration of the 1942 Nazi rafle in Tunis, a round-up of more than 5,000 Tunisian Jewish 
men for forced labor.  Claude Nataf, the Tunisian-born historian responsible for creating the 
SHJT and the commemoration, explained the ritual by emphasizing the importance of both the 
rafle and its memorialization in the context of the larger story of the Nazi genocide.  Noting that 
Tunisian Jews had long felt too “ashamed” vis-à-vis European Jewish suffering to tell their own 
story, Nataf argued that “the reality of this round-up, the only one outside of Europe, shows the 
universality of the Nazi genocidal project” (Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives 2011).  
In keeping with this understanding, the commemoration has been held since 2005 at France’s 
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Mémorial de la Shoah [Holocaust Memorial] in Paris.1  And over the years it has become an 
increasingly visible event, attracting a growing number of public dignitaries—the mayor of Paris, 
the head of French institutional Judaism—as well as serving as a platform for exhibits, lectures, 
and film screenings about North African Jewish experiences during the Second World War.   
The creation of such a commemoration is, at first glance, not surprising.  In the French 
context, Nataf’s innovation can be tied to a more general trend in the memorialization of the 
Shoah.2  Beginning in the 1980s, French government practice created unprecedented public 
space for the expression of collective difference in France.  As a result, after years of relative 
Jewish silence about, as well as French state denial of, the specifically Jewish dimension of 
Second World War suffering, public Holocaust commemorations increased dramatically in the 
1980s and early 1990s (Conan and Rousso 1994; M. Mandel 2003; Rousso 1994; Wieviorka 
1992; Wolf 2004). Of these new rituals, the 1993 creation of an annual Vel d’Hiv’ 
commemoration, a ceremony marking the anniversary of the July 1942 rafle of almost 13,000 
Paris-based Jews, presents an obvious model for and parallel to the memorialization of the 
Tunisian round-up.3  Nataf’s ceremony can also be understood within a larger framework of 
French (and European) identity politics and what is often called the concurrence des victimes 
[competition among victims] (Benbassa 2006; Blanchard, Lemaire, and Bancel 2006; Bonniol 
2007; Chaumont 2010; Trigano 2006).  Since at least the early 2000s, as popular and political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 The Memorial opened in 2005. 
2 The Hebrew term Shoah is commonly used in French to refer to the Jewish genocide.   
3 Vel d’hiv’ is an abbreviation of Velodrôme d’Hiver, the name of the bicycle track in the 15th 
arrondissement where Jews were held until deported.  The ceremony was initially authorized by 
President François Mitterrand and has since been attended by every sitting French president. 
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tolerance for the relatively recent explosion of visible public difference has ebbed, much of 
France’s public minority politics has taken the form of zero sum arguments about relative 
victimization.  As I will illustrate more fully below, in a context of ever-greater public fear of 
certain forms of collective difference, evoking the Holocaust, whether metaphorically or 
historically, has become a way for both Jewish and non-Jewish minorities to attempt to establish 
a privileged and exclusive relationship to public sympathy and good will.  And finally, Nataf’s 
innovation is closely tied to global trends in Holocaust memory and memorialization.  Most 
notably, in Israel where the Holocaust is part of a national narrative of Jewish identity, the 
children and grandchildren of North African immigrants have increasingly internalized the 
Holocaust as part of their own sense of self and Jewishness, see further (Yablonka 2009). 
But there is also much that remains surprising about the historical commemoration of the 
Tunis round-up as part and parcel of the Shoah.  As we will see below, French Jews of North 
African origin, their children, and grandchildren hardly ever narrated their (sometimes horrific) 
Second World War experiences as part of the Holocaust.  In addition, no mass deportations or 
systematic exterminations took place in Francophone North Africa.  To varying degrees, Vichy 
officials enacted and enforced discriminatory, anti-Jewish legislation in all three of France’s 
North African territories, most particularly Algeria.  Several thousand North African and 
European Jews were sent to labor camps located in Algeria and Morocco, where some died of 
disease, malnutrition, or exposure.  And the Nazis also briefly and brutally occupied Tunisia 
from late 1942 until early 1943.  But only a handful of Tunisian Jews died and even fewer were 
executed during the occupation.4  In stark contrast, only a handful of the Jews deported from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 For accounts of Jewish experiences in World War II era Francophone North Africa, see further 
(Abitbol 1989; Boum 2014; Cherif 2011; E. Katz 2012; Kenbib 2014; Msellati 1999; Stein 2014; 
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Vel d’Hiv’ survived.  In fact, as I will show, making the Tunisian rafle the opening act of the 
Nazi Final Solution in North Africa requires assenting to a series of historical counter-factuals 
about what would have happened to North African Jews—mass deportations to Europe, the 
construction of local death camps, the murderous complicity of local Muslims—had the Allies 
not triumphed as quickly as they did.  So there is a puzzle behind Nataf’s ceremony and the 
scores of similar initiatives that have appeared in France over the last decade or so.  Why are 
some French Jewish institutional elites like Nataf working against French Jewish memory and 
narrating Second World War-era North African Jewish experiences as part and parcel of the 
history of the Holocaust itself?  How do these new narratives differ from the everyday ways that 
North African Jews talked and talk about their relationship to the Holocaust?  And finally, how 
might attention to these different narratives help us understand contemporary French Jewish 
efforts to negotiate belonging at multiple sociological scales, namely as members of a global 
Jewish community, European civilization, and the French nation? 
In this article, I suggest that Nataf’s commemoration of the Tunis rafle is one prominent 
example of an intentional, perhaps even pedagogical, attempt to reframe French Jewish and non-
Jewish understandings of both history and the Holocaust.  As we will see, from at least the 1980s 
on, intra-Jewish arguments about the Holocaust, what it was, when it was, whom it impacted, 
and who could talk about it, produced either North African Jewish exclusion from European 
Jewishness or a free-floating, almost metaphorical understanding of the Holocaust itself.  I will 
argue that post-2000, many French Jewish elites like Nataf found both of these options 
problematic.  In a context in which French minority groups were both increasingly ethnicized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Stora 2006).  For an account of Metropolitan Jewish deportation and death rates, see further 
(Marrus and Paxton 1981). 
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and denationalized because of that ethnicization, North African Jewish exclusion from the 
“European” Holocaust had become socially and politically intolerable to French Jewish elites 
focused on conjugating Jewishness and Frenchness or Europeanness.  At the same time, the 
refraction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in France (and Europe more widely) made purely 
metaphorical understandings of the Holocaust—understandings that allowed the Shoah to be 
appropriated by both non-European Jews and non-Jews (including Palestinians)—politically 
abhorrent.  As a result, Jewish elites like Nataf began encouraging French Jews to reframe how 
they talked, felt, and thought about the Holocaust, a reframing that required rethinking the nature 
of time and causality itself.  
Drawing on ethnographic data from the mid-2000s as well as accounts from French 
Jewish newspapers and magazines from the 1980s on, I make this argument by tracing out two 
different ways that French Jews attempted to grapple with the relationship between North 
African Jewry and the “European” Holocaust before the late 1990s.  I focus less on the narratives 
themselves than on the different understandings of causality and time—the historicities—that 
underlie and authorize them, see further (Trouillot 1995; Sahlins 1985).  Loosely following 
Walter Benjamin (1974), who has famously written about the shape of time and the consequent 
relationships between pasts and presents, I call these two different historicities messianic and 
linear.  As I will show, the narratives associated with these historicities produced angry clashes, 
clashes that reified potentially threatening forms of internal Jewish difference, most particularly 
“Sephardi” or “North African” Jewishness, on the one hand, and “Ashkenazi” or “European” 
Jewishness, on the other.  These difficulties set the stage for the emergence of Nataf’s 
“pedagogical” historicity, a hybrid form that takes elements from both messianic and linear 
accounts while sidestepping the political and social impasses produced by them.  This new 
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“pedagogical” historicity assumed and helped produce a more expansive and homogenized 
“European” Jewishness, thus resituating all French Jews as part and parcel of an emergent, anti-
Arab and anti-Muslim “Judeo-Christian” Europe.   
In making this argument about the political and sociological shifts that have impacted 
French Jews over the last two decades and inspired new forms of Holocaust talk, I seek to 
contribute to two very different scholarly conversations.  I will return to these contributions in 
the conclusion, but want to flag them here.  On the one hand, I am adding to a storied literature 
in anthropology and history on the ways that conceptions of time and causality define the 
sensibilities of particular groups (e.g. Anderson 2006; Evans-Pritchard 1969; Durkheim and 
Mauss 1967; Geertz 1973; Malkki 1995; Spiegel 2002; Yerushalami 1996).  That literature, 
however, tends to assume that particular historicities define and delimit particular groups, 
whether those groups are defined historically, ethno-culturally, or ethno-religiously.  I, however, 
hope to show that arguments about historicity are part and parcel of the construction of group 
identity and boundaries, not just artifacts of clearly established lines of difference.  On the other 
hand, I am speaking to anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists interested in the 
problem of pluralism in contemporary Europe (e.g. Asad 2003, 2006, Bowen 2007, 2009, Cesari 
2014, 1998; Fernando 2014; Laurence and Vaisse 2005; Roy 2005).  Many of these writers seem 
to assume that the negotiation of European pluralism is a problem that no longer applies to Jews, 
either because the Holocaust turned Jews into quintessential Europeans or because Jews have no 
real future in post-modern Europe, see further (Hammerschlag 2016).  But I believe Nataf’s 
North African Shoah illustrates just how embroiled contemporary French Jews continue to be in 
old/new questions of group difference and belonging in contemporary Europe. 
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Jewish Pluralism and French Homogeneity  
The background for Nataf’s pedagogical innovation, and in fact many intra-Jewish 
discussions of the Holocaust, is a crisis over what exactly it might mean to be a French or 
European Jew.  This is a very old problem, dating back to at least the French Revolution and 
appearing in a variety of guises throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. This old problem revolved 
around two central issues: the coherence and “representability” of Jewishness itself vis-à-vis a 
state that modeled “religion” around Catholicism and the subordination of Jewish belonging to 
national identity. 5  The latest round of these new/old questions about French Jewishness and 
Jewish Frenchness can be tied to French decolonization of North Africa.  In the decades 
following the Second World War, as the French North African Empire crumbled, France became 
the preferred destination for almost all Algerian, as well as many Moroccan and Tunisian, Jews.  
By the mid-1960s, such migration had more than doubled the post-war French Jewish population 
(Bensimon and Della Pergola 1984) and laid the groundwork for decades of disputes over 
communal leadership positions, prayer spaces, forms of religiosity, and politics (e.g. Arkin 2014; 
Davidson 2015; Poirier 1998; Podselver 1986).  By the early 2000s, a study funded by the Fonds 
Social Juif Unifié [FSJU], the major Jewish philanthropic organization in France, estimated the 
total Jewish population in France at about 500-575,000 people.  For the first time since the 
1960s, while slightly more than half of Jewish heads of household were still foreign born, the 
majority of the total French Jewish population hailed from Metropolitan France (Cohen 2002).  
But while French Jews in the early 2000s were increasingly French, there are indications that 
they were also increasingly ethnically identified and divided.  A 1988 demographic survey 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  On	  the	  question	  of	  Jewish	  plurality,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  problem	  of	  homogenized	  Jewish	  Frenchness	  from	  the	  Revolution	  through	  the	  1980s,	  see	  further	  (Albert	  1977;	  Birnbaum	  2000;	  B.	  de	  Gasquet	  2016;	  Graetz	  1996;	  Leff	  2006;	  Schechter	  2003)	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sponsored by the FSJU found that 50% of Jews interviewed identified themselves as  “Sephardi,” 
34% as “Ashkenazi” and 16% as “neither” (Cohen 2002, 12).  In a 2002 follow-up study, the 
number of Sephardim jumped to 70%; the number of Ashkenazim dropped to 24%, and 6% 
claimed to be both Sephardi and Ashkenazi (ibid.).  In the 14 years that separated the two 
studies, “neither” disappeared as a category, suggesting increased ethnic identification within 
Jewishness.   
At the same time that “Ashkenazi”/”Sephardi” distinctions seemed to became more 
important to French Jews, the question of the “Europeanness” of Jews in France also became 
more urgent.  This urgency came about indirectly, through turn of the century French and 
European public engagement with the “Muslim question.” In the 1980s, under the socialist 
government of François Mitterrand, France had (briefly) experimented the ethno-cultural 
pluralization of the public sphere, an experiment that quickly was appropriated by the hard right 
in its attempts to justify excluding France’s former colonial populations through reference to 
essential cultural differences (e.g. Silverstein 2004; Pierre-André Taguieff 2001).  By the late 
1990s and the early 2000s, faced with the specter of a global Islamic revival both the left and 
right had firmly rejected multiculturalism as a model for French pluralism and instead started 
seeking to define and defend (various) understandings of core “French” identity.  Thus the first 
decade of the 2000s saw raucous public debates about laïcité [secularism] and its role in creating 
a framework for everyday French life, as well as government-sponsored discussions about the 
contours and content of French national identity.  All sorts of vastly divergent positions were 
taken during these debates (Bowen 2007), only some of which were explicitly anti-Muslim.  But 
regardless of the complexity of these political positions, framing the conversation around the 
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(im)possibility of Frenchness for Muslim “immigrants” born and raised in France helped 
ethnicize the French Republic itself.  
If the ethnicization of the Republic worked to exclude “Muslims,” here understood in 
Naomi Davidson’s terms as racialized bearers of incommensurable religious differences (2012), 
it did so in ways that potentially threatened French Jews.  As many scholars have noted, French 
public discourse about Muslims slipped constantly between religion and other geographical and 
cultural markers, namely Maghrebi origin and “Arab” ethno-cultural features (e.g. Fernando 
2014; Hargreaves 1995; Tetreault 2015; Silverstein 2004). This slippage has allowed Islam and 
Muslims to be continuously ascribed extra-European origins and thus cultural realities, which 
were then used as explanations for supposed Muslim inassimilability, see further (Asad 2003).  I 
have argued elsewhere that focusing on “extra-European” origins and attributes as a “problem” 
has the potential to threaten (some) Jews’ Frenchness (Arkin 2014).  Over the past three decades, 
Jews of North African origin have become increasingly visible in ways that mirror religious, 
political, and cultural developments among Muslims of North African origin (Benayoun 1993; 
Podselver 1986).  As a result, by the early 2000s, the division of French Jewry into 
“Ashkenazim” and “Sephardim,” meaning  “Europeans” and “North Africans,” threatened to 
become more than just a fraught intra-Jewish issue.  In a context where French Jews could be 
read as foreigners, the division of French Jewry into “Europeans” and “North Africans” was 
viewed by many as particularly pernicious and problematic, see further (Trigano 2003).  And this 
is precisely the context in which some Jewish elites began rethinking the temporal and 
geographical frame of the Holocaust. 
  
The “European” Holocaust and French Sephardim 
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But before getting to Nataf in the mid-2000s, I am going to flesh out some of the ways 
that French Jews have talked to each other about the Holocaust over the past 30 or so years.  At 
least since the 1980s, the Holocaust has been a discursive site at which public battles around 
Jewish unity and difference have been fought.6  Given the significance of Holocaust experience 
for defining Europe as a cultural and political project (Bunzl 2004, 2007; Judt 1992) as well as 
European Jewishness, North African Jews’ relationship to the Holocaust is both important and 
problematic.  In everyday talk and in public discourse, North African Jews have both connected 
themselves to and distanced themselves from what, for better or for worse, is typically imagined 
as a “European” event.  “European” Jews have, in turn, often reacted angrily to all these attempts 
to situate North African Jews vis-à-vis the Shoah.  Here I will analyze a few examples of these 
fraught intra-Jewish debates by drawing on newspaper accounts that pit “Ashkenazim” against 
“Sephardim” in a battle to define the Holocaust in temporal, geographical, and religious terms.  
In August 2000, Ovadia Yossef, the former Sephardi chief rabbi of Israel and head of the 
right-wing Sephardi religious party Shas, made headlines in the French Jewish (and non-Jewish) 
press.  Yossef had given a Sabbath sermon in which he explained that those who had been killed 
during the Shoah harbored the reincarnated spirits of the Jews who had helped build the golden 
calf (Agence France Presse 2000).  This particular and deeply controversial theodicy has roots in 
medieval mystic Jewish thought about transmigration and reincarnation of particularly sinful 
souls.  It also is part of a long-standing attempt to explain the Holocaust within a Jewish theodicy 
that emphasizes divine punishment as a reaction to Jewish sin.7  But the comment sparked 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  has	  also	  been	  true	  in	  Israel,	  see	  further	  (Yablonka	  2009).	  
7	  As early as 1947, the Ashkenazi rabbi of Hasidei Sokolover-Kotsek in Tel Aviv, Hayim Yisrael 
Tsimerman, offered just such an explanation of the Holocaust.  According to Gershon 
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intense anger and discussion in Israel as part of an ethnicized reconfiguration of political and 
religious authority, one that pitted establishment Ashkenazim against second and third generation 
Mizrachim and Sephardim (Yablonka 2009).  And it had similar repercussions in France.  The 
French media immediately connected the Shas’ leaders comments to those that had been made 
by French Chief Rabbi Joseph Sitruk three years earlier in interviews with journalists (Sitruk 
1997; Ternisien 2000).  In those interviews, Sitruk tried to distance himself from a theology 
linking the Holocaust to divine punishment, while also engaging with many of the premises of 
that theology, notably reincarnation and the terrible sin of Jewish assimilation in the 19th century, 
see further (Farhi 2000).  Summing up his ambivalent position, Sitruk noted: “...[f]or our wise 
men, the explanation of the Holocaust resembles that of the smoker who is dying of cancer 
because he did not take care of his health.  To follow the metaphor, I would tell you that Israel 
cannot die quietly in bed when Israel is no longer Israel” (cited in Farhi 2000). 
Yossef’s comments therefore renewed public attention to Sitruk’s theodicy and resulted 
in some public tensions between more liberal French rabbis—notably the Parisian reform Rabbi 
Daniel Farhi and the Parisian Maasorti rabbi Rivon Krygier—and Sitruk (Mopsik and Krygier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Greenberg, “Tsimerman…invoked the sixteenth-century Kabbalist Hayim Vital’s notion that the 
souls of one generation could return to a later generation for punishment, and he averred that the 
Holocaust was the punishment for several earlier sinful generations” (S. Katz, Biderman, and 
Greenberg 2007, 13).  Hayin Vital had drawn his arguments from Yitzak Luria, the 16th century 
mystic, who explained that God made the souls of those who had committed grave sins in the 
Biblical past “transmigrate” to future generations that were destined for great punishment (ibid, 
165-6). 	  
	   12	  
n.d.; Ternisien 2000).  But the objections to Yossef and Sitruk were not simply theological.  
Sitruk, it should be noted, was only the second North African Jew to hold the position of French 
Chief Rabbi, and he—like Ovadia Yossef—was associated with an inflexible, anti-intellectual, 
and not particularly textually-informed form of orthodoxy.  The angry letters that followed the 
Yossef/Sitruk controversy therefore became an occasion for recriminations rooted not only in 
religious differences, but also in supposedly essential differences between Ashkenazim and 
Sephardim.  In a letter to the editor of the religious newspaper Actualité Juive about the 
controversy, Yvan Haggiag noted that Rabbis Yossef and Sitruk had simply told the “truth,” 
which was that God punished Jews who did not observe all His mitzvoth [commandments] and 
keep themselves “different” (Haggiag 2000).  Another Actualité Juive reader, Eric Jarville, 
reframed Haggiag’s religious/non-religious divide as an ethno-historical gap between Sephardim 
and Ashkenazim. He wrote:  
As a practicing Ashkenazi Jew, I deny all my Sephardi brothers the right to 
comment, evaluate, weigh, and most importantly judge this tragic part of our 
history.  It is clear that only the Sephardi fringe allows itself to weigh in on the 
unnameable, having no or very little familial experience (Salonica Jews excepted) 
with this black period.  So pity on this issue, my Sephardi brothers, even more so 
if you think of yourself as religious: be silent, silent! (Jarville 2000). 
This incident was also not the first time that religious theodicy around the Holocaust had become 
a topic of both secular and “Ashkenazi” displeasure.  Ten years earlier, Charles Szlakmann, a 
contributor to Actualité Juive, had noted with concern Yiddish language activist Richard 
Marienstras’ admonition that Sephardim not talk about the Shoah “because it is in very bad taste 
for people whose communities were spared… to give lessons about Judaism” (Szlakmann 1990).  
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In other words, Marienstras clearly thought “Sephardim” who knew nothing about the Holocaust 
should keep their self-righteous theodicy to themselves. 
What is going on in these bitter arguments over the Holocaust?  And what, if anything, 
does it have to do with the relationship between historicity and the contours of Jewish 
community and belonging?  Marienstras and Jarville certainly seem to have understood Yossef, 
Sitruk, and Haggiag’s accounts as narrowing the scope of both the Holocaust and of Jewishness 
by writing some (mostly Sephardi) Jews out of the genocide on the grounds of their stricter piety 
and adherence to divine law.  Indeed, instead of seeing the horrible hand of historical 
contingency behind the events of the Shoah, the rabbis seemed to see differential merit and 
divinely allocated retribution.  Marienstras and Jarville, in turn, read this account of differential 
merit and retribution as a story about ontologically different kinds of Jews.  They presumed that 
the rabbis saw differential divine favor mapping onto a European/North African divide, one that 
followed a division between religious and non-religious.  And while Marienstras and Jarville 
denounced such a reading of divine favor, they themselves divided Jewishness along precisely 
those same lines, presuming that knowledge, authority, and even the right to speak about a major 
event in Jewish history came with seemingly continuous and heritable experience in relation to 
an exclusively European Holocaust.  But while Marienstras and Jarville’s presumption that a 
European/North African divide motivated both the rabbis’ theology and its total illegitimacy, the 
rabbis comments were in fact more complex than such a reading suggests.  
The anger and incomprehension that Marienstras and Jarville brought to this conversation 
about theology and the Holocaust highlights an epistemic clash between their own 
understandings of Jewish temporality and locality, on the one hand, and those invoked by the 
rabbis, on the other (Yerushalami 1996).  For the rabbis quoted above, history does not appear to 
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be a series of events connected by cause and effect in linear time.  This rejection of linear cause 
and effect is most clear within a mystical framework of reincarnation, where sins committed by 
others hundreds, if not thousands, of years before result in devastating forms of divine retribution 
in the modern world.  Punishing Jews who worshipped the Golden Calf by reincarnating them as 
Holocaust victims requires what Benedict Anderson, following Walter Benjamin, has called a 
“messianic” realm of simultaneity: “a simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous 
present” that is alien to linear and causal conceptions of history (Anderson 2006, 24).  Even 
Sitruk’s less mystical version of the Holocaust—in which God punishes (some) Jews collectively 
for sins committed (by others) in their lifetimes—conjures up relations of cause and effect that 
do not operate in a flat linear framework.  Instead, Sitruk may be suggesting that contemporary 
Jewish experiences can only be made sense of through cyclical time—an endless cycle of sin, 
punishment, and redemption that requires the hidden but all-important hand of the timeless 
divine (Spiegel 2002; Yerushalami 1996).  As a result, despite their differences, Yossef and 
Sitruk’s stories rely on an appeal to a transcendent and perhaps even ahistorical/atemporal realm 
of divine will and justice—a kind of messianic time-outside-of-time and causality.  
These messianic historicities conjure up forms of Jewish unity that Marienstras and 
Jareville may have found incomprehensible and perhaps unimaginable.  In the 1970s and 1980s, 
Marienstras was one of the most famous French advocates for what he called “diasporic” forms 
of Jewish identity, meaning non-state oriented, transnational and yet highly localized forms of 
Jewish difference.  Marienstras argued that it was precisely these deeply local differences that 
allowed for Jewish survival by ensuring that Jews were not everywhere subjected to the same 
assimilatory pressures (Marienstras 1975, 15).  Although Marienstras insisted that Jewish 
diasporas must “recognize one another among themselves” (Marienstras 1975, 16), his portrait of 
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Jewish diaspora was rooted almost exclusively in an European imaginary and temporality 
(particularly Yiddish culture and the Holocaust) and thus produced somewhat incommensurable 
local Jewishnesses (Marienstras 1975, 2007).  This is certainly evident in Marienstras’ 
understanding of conservative theological explanations of Holocaust as unwanted “Sephardi,” 
read North African, meddling in a sociocultural world from which they are historically and 
geographically excluded.  In other words, for Marienstras and Jarville, the irreducibly local 
dimensions of Jewish experiences are embedded in linear historical continuities and are 
emphasized above and beyond transcendent Jewish unity.  In addition, such assumptions about 
geography and linear continuity do not just highlight pre-existing fault lines; they actually help 
produce them.  Thus the linking of conservative theological grappling with the Holocaust to 
“Sephardi” difference turns a universal Jewish problem--one that has long plagued both 
Ashkenazi and Sephardi religious thinkers—into a sign of ethno-geographical distinction. 
In contrast, for the rabbis, Jewish peoplehood does not lie in local specificities that must, 
somehow, be connected to one another across the differential (national, cultural) effects of causal 
relations playing out in linear time.  Rather, Jewishness seems not only to transcend differences 
in geography, culture, and degree of religious observance, but also to be transhistorical.   Again, 
this is most clear in the argument for reincarnation.  Otherwise, how could the same “souls” who 
sacrificed to the golden calf also have suffered and died during the Holocaust?  It also applies to 
narratives of collective punishment where the specific identity of the sinner is less significant 
than his or her membership in a translocal and transhistorical community. And while this kind of 
logic does make some Jewish bodies differentially bear the burden of both individual and 
collective Jewish sin, they can only do so as Jews whose relationship to the divine is supposed to 
be the same as that of all other Jews.  Put very simply, you cannot be punished for breaking a 
	   16	  
contract that was never yours to begin with.  In other words, what Marienstras and Jarveille read 
as the transformation of linear historical accident into ethnically distinctive Jewish merit was 
actually in many ways an insistence on Jewish identity that exists outside the realm of empirical 
difference.  Jews are connected to other Jews first and foremost as Jews, and only secondarily as 
specific kinds of Jews in specific times and places.  From this perspective, “ethnic” (Sephardi 
and Ashkenazi), geographical (North African and European), and civilizational (European and 
Arab) differences between groups of Jews are less important than an ideal of transcendent Jewish 
unity.   
This first example juxtaposes certain religious understandings of time and history with 
the “empty, homogenous time” and linear historicity associated with modern secularity 
(Anderson 2006).   But not only religious Jews embraced messianic narratives.  In fact, 
messianic historicity in Holocaust narratives comes in fully secularized versions.  And these fully 
secularized versions clash just as dramatically with linear historical perspectives.  According to 
Joan Wolf, by the 1980s many French Jews from North Africa had come to understand the 
relationship between their experiences and those of European Jews through analogy, particularly 
by comparing North African Jews’ post-colonial experiences to those of European Jews during 
the Holocaust (Wolf 2004, 31).  Some of my own research has turned up a few examples of such 
understandings.  In April 1983, the Jewish women’s cultural magazine Coopération Feminine 
ran an issue on Jewish women’s experiences in France.  A letter published in the issue discussed 
the elective affinity North African Jews saw between their experiences of dispossession and 
exile, on the one hand, and European Jews’ denationalization and deportation during the Second 
World War, on the other.  For those articulating this kind of position, North African Jews’ 
connection to the Holocaust was not direct; but shared Jewishness produced different yet 
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comparable historical experiences, including uprooting and banishment.  In other words, 
Jewishness was a privileged cause for a particular set of isomorphic effects, particularly 
suffering, displacement, and exile.  Like the messianic stories rooted in the transhistorical unity 
of all Jews, these narratives also cannot be understood in linear historical time.  Instead, they 
require vertical reasoning into a transcendent realm of simultaneity.  But here this transcendent 
realm is secularized as something like the universal “national” condition of Jews in exile. 
Not surprisingly, the extension of the Holocaust to North African Jews through elective 
affinity elicited a backlash.  In the same April 1983 issue of Coopération Feminine, Jacqueline 
Atlas denounced any comparison between North African exile and Holocaust experience, noting 
that North African Jews had a “choice” between France and Israel while Jews during the 
Holocaust had no choices (Atlas 1983, 11).  The well-known Jewish journalist, and 
granddaughter of Holocaust survivors, Anne Sinclair added: “It’s certain that for people who 
experienced deportation, the problems of a [North African] woman arriving in Sarcelles [a peri-
urban neighborhood with public housing built for the influx of French refugees after 
decolonization] seem irrelevant” (Sinclair 1983, 12).  Here, once again, we have the attempt to 
locate Jewish unity in a transcendent realm called into question through an insistence on the 
differential effects (if not causes) of European and North African Jewish suffering.  In other 
words, in a purely linear and horizontal reckoning of cause-and-effect, there is no space for 
contemporary Sephardim and Ashkenazim to share the Holocaust as part of their constitutive 
experiences as either European or French Jews. 
None of the examples cited above contained the tropes that I heard most during my 
fieldwork in the mid-2000s.  Although I was not interviewing people about the Holocaust, in a 
period of anxiety about increased anti-Semitism it came up in everyday settings and 
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conversations.  And in those contexts, there seemed to be a new configuration of the same 
opposition tracked through my previous examples: a transcendent appeal to unity of Jewish 
experience (messianism) juxtaposed with a linear historical critique.  Here I want to give one 
particularly dramatic example.   
In February 2005, I attended a talk given by Yves Azéroual, a journalist, author, and 
former editor of the Jewish magazine Tribune Juive, at the Paris Centre Communautaire, a 
Jewish Community Center in the heart of France’s capital.  Unlike most Jewish organizations in 
France, community centers are one of the few places where you can find a diverse Jewish public, 
including the secular and the religious, Ashkenazim and Sephardim, members of the working 
class and bourgeoisie.8  The talk was about negative depictions of Israel in the French media; but 
Azéroual wanted to make clear “entre nous” [amongst ourselves, meaning within a Jewish 
context] that not every negative depiction was a result of anti-Semitism, whether on the part of 
journalists, the French state, or the larger French public.  As Azéroual explained: “The friends of 
Israel are numerous.  I hear Jews in the community tell me all the time that Chirac [then center-
right President of France] is anti-Semitic, that everyone is anti-Semitic, that Jews are alone in the 
world, that journalists are corrupt.  It’s simply not true.  There are some journalists who are 
militants [radicals], who are probably paid to defend Palestine.  But this is not typical. Most 
people are just ignorant.” 
This approach frustrated some audience members, whose perceptions Azéroual had just 
dismissed as feeling rather than reality.  Among them, a distraught middle-aged woman with a 
thick North African accent, asked: “Do you really think they are not all against us?  It’s all we 
see.”  Another audience member seconded her sentiment: “This must be the same as it was at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Béatrice	  de	  Gasquet	  for	  pointing	  this	  out.	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time of the Nazis; the same kind of mise en scène [theatrical display] of Jewish evil.”  A few 
minutes later, the first audience member returned to the Holocaust theme, exploding: “I feel like 
we are going to be eaten by them [the anti-Semitic French].  It’s another Shoah that is getting 
underway.”   
This outburst immediately resulted in both Azéroual and the evening’s moderator giving 
the audience a lecture, again “entre nous,” on its profound “misunderstanding” of history.  
Azéroual began by asking/telling the middle-aged woman: “Please tell us that you do not really 
believe that.”  When the woman responded that she absolutely did believe what she had said, the 
evening’s moderator took over from the speaker: “What do you think is going on right now that 
is like the Shoah?”  The woman, at that point flustered and visibly embarrassed, misinterpreted 
the question and assumed that she was being quizzed on her historical knowledge of the 
Holocaust.  “I didn’t live it,” she cried defensively, throwing her hands up in the air, “I don't 
know.  All I know is that Jews were killed all over Europe for being Jews!”  Another female 
audience member offered a sotto voce amen chorus, mumbling: “anti-Semitism is growing in 
France!”  Calmly and didactically, the evening’s moderator took over: 
I want to clarify something.  One cannot compare France, in which even if it is 
not a real attack [a reference to the staged or faked anti-Semitic attacks that had 
taken place in Paris over the previous year], the government protests immediately, 
going out to the community center that burned, one after another, because they are 
worried about what you will think given what happened during the Shoah.  When 
a synagogue burns, or even 10 in the current climate, you cannot say that it is 
Kristallnacht.  We may disagree over Israel, but when Jews are attacked, the 
French government, for the last two, three, even four years has been there. 
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This uncomfortable exchange has many of the elements of the conflicts recounted above.  
But in the fraught context of post-2000s France, there is also an added emphasis for both 
Azéroual and the moderator on the relationship between Holocaust narratives and contemporary 
Jewish Frenchness.  For the audience, and most particularly the flustered woman who was 
reliving the Holocaust in contemporary France, the Holocaust had become unmoored.  From this 
perspective, the Shoah is not a defined historical event, circumscribed geographically and 
temporally linked to the rise and fall of the Third Reich.  Instead, it is continuously unfolding, 
embedded in the universal and transhistorical problem of violent anti-Semitism.  For a number of 
distressed audience members, then, the temporal and sociological differences between Europe in 
the 1930s and the early 2000s were far less relevant than what Veena Das has called the 
“unfinished” past—a past that “can suddenly press upon the world with the same insistence and 
obstinacy with which the real creates holes in the symbolic” (Das 2007, 134).   
By linking all Jews to a visceral experience of the Holocaust, this “unfinished” past 
seems to function as a secular version of messianism.  Walter Benjamin famously described this 
kind of historicity through his description of the “Angel of History.”  He writes: “The Angel of 
History must look just so.  His face is turned towards the past.  Where we see the appearance of a 
chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble on top of rubble 
and hurls it before his feet…” (Benjamin 1974).  This is precisely what the woman at the 
Community Center saw: an on-going calamity that was neither past nor present, but both 
simultaneously.  To quote Benjamin again, this is a “here-and-now” form of historicity that fits 
very uncomfortably with the “empty, homogenous time” of linear historical narratives.  It is also 
a mode of understanding the Holocaust that makes both temporal and geographical borders 
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irrelevant.  As a result, Sephardi/Ashkenazi or North African/European differences appear to be 
far less important than a Jewish/non-Jewish divide that unifies Jews historically and 
geographically, while alienating them from the nation-states in which they happen to be living.  
Thus the flustered woman’s conviction that “we” [the Jews] are going to be eaten by an 
unspecified “them;” this them without an antecedent could have referred to the non-Jewish 
French, the European population more generally, or even to a wider world that seemed—for 
many in France—to have turned its back on the Jews and Israel.  
 But also once again, this mode of narrating Jewish unity through a messianic historicity 
was countered by a linear historical argument.  Note that Azéroual and the moderator 
immediately lectured the audience on “misunderstanding” history.  In their didactic response, 
Azéroual and the moderator made a concerted attempt to counter the audience members’ 
temporally unmoored understanding of the Holocaust with a cause-and-effect, and therefore 
supposedly more “rational,” temporality and narrative.  The speaker and moderator re-embedded 
the Holocaust in a particular sociological context, if not historical moment, by insisting that a 
crucial feature of the Holocaust was state involvement in, rather than opposition to, anti-Semitic 
activities.  The fact that the 21st century French state immediately condemned anti-Semitic acts 
differentiated contemporary Parisian Jews’ experiences with anti-Semitism from those of the 
1930s.  So for Azéroual and the moderator, there was a clear sociological, as well as temporal, 
divide between the present experienced by all French Jews and the past.  
 This re-grounding of the Holocaust in a specific time and context had the effect of 
renationalizing French Jewry.  If the Holocaust both signified and produced Jewish 
denationalization all over Europe, Azéroual and the moderator insisted on the Frenchness of 
contemporary French Jews by aligning contemporary Jewish interests with those of the state.  
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Thus the moderator listed all the ways in which the French state and government had worked to 
combat anti-Semitism over the previous few years, work he said was designed to prove to 
skeptical Jews how much they really were a part of normative French national imaginaries.  In 
addition, the thrust of the talk itself—which focused on the ways in which journalists and French 
intellectuals were often anti-Israel out of ignorance rather than anti-Semitism—highlighted 
political and cultural similarities across the Jewish/(post)Christian divide in France.  Parrying the 
audience’s sense of the abject position of Jews in France, the moderator noted: “I can say this 
because we are entre nous, it is easier to be a Jew than an Arab in France.  We may need to 
condemn the way that certain young beur [an old slang term for Arab] behave, but the 
government itself is irreproachable.”  In other words, both Azéroual and the moderator were 
working to re-ground the Holocaust sociologically and temporally in order to convince their 
audience of their Frenchness. 
But the price of this Frenchness was in fact a set of divisions within French Jewry, 
divisions that threatened to exclude some Jews from the national framework itself.  Recall the 
speaker who thought Jews were going to be “eaten” by the anti-Semitic French.  She became 
flustered when asked to give historical details to back up her sense of an impending Shoah, and 
in her confusion she ultimately excluded herself both generationally (she was too young) and 
geographically (she was not in Europe) from the Holocaust narrative itself—“I don’t know [what 
happened]; I wasn’t there.”  In addition, the way the speaker and the moderator responded—with 
a didactic lecture presenting the “facts” of the case—created an epistemological gap between 
their forms of authoritative historical knowledge, on the one hand, and the irrational “feelings” of 
the audience, on the other.   
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This epistemological divide not only literally shamed the audience into silence, it also 
mapped uncomfortably onto the ethnicized division of French Jewry.  The division between 
“intellectual” and “emotional” Jews is a trope that was and still is used to explain the relationship 
between European and North African Jews, see further (Arkin 2014).  It was evoked by many of 
my Sephardi informants themselves in its moral mirror image form; they contrasted their 
emotional joie de vivre with the hyperrational, cold affect that they associated with 
“Ashkenazim.”  It was even reproduced in some Jewish institutional spaces; in the mid-2000s, 
the Musée d’Art et d’Histoire du Judaïsme in Paris housed exhibits that linked Ashkenazim to 
male textual study and Sephardim to opulent women’s dress.  In other words, although Azéroual 
was himself not old enough to have survived the Holocaust and, if his last name is any 
indication, may not hail from a “European” family, in that moment he could easily have been 
understood as instantiating an “Ashkenazi” or European mode of authority.  This mode of 
authority relies on dates, strict chronology, and textual sources and opposes the affective and 
personal authority of temporally unmoored, oral, and self-consciously subjectivist history, see 
further (e.g. Goody 1977; Goody and Watt 1968; Ong 1982; Shryock 1997).  Out of his 
audience’s sense of collective victimization grounded in a messianic historicity, Azéroual and the 
moderator produced visceral experiences of difference tied to an Orientalist divide (Said 1978), 
one that both pressured Jews to think and act like French nationals and Europeans while also 
implicitly questioning their capacity to be appropriately French and European.9  
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  This was hardly a unique occurrence.  I saw this kind of elite mockery of overwhelmingly 
North African Jewish publics repeatedly in Parisian community centers and Jewish schools.  	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Teaching A North African Shoah? 
The impasse with which the Parisian Community Center interchange ends calls for a 
solution, a solution that cannot be found in either messianic or linear historical narratives.  Why? 
By the beginning of the Second Intifada, messianic approaches based either on an “unmoored” or 
metaphorical Holocaust had become politically untenable, particularly for Jewish elites.  The 
Community Center vignette viscerally illustrates how an “unmoored” Holocaust raises the 
question of Jewish “Frenchness” and belonging at a moment when many Jewish elites were 
working hard to naturalize Jewish Frenchness (see above).  The non-linear, analogic reasoning 
many North African Jews used to write themselves into the “European” Holocaust was even 
more politically problematic.  Such arguments have the potential to undermine the Holocaust’s 
uniqueness as well as its Jewishness by suggesting that other events at other moments in time 
produce isomorphic communities of suffering.  This kind of extension of the Holocaust has long 
been intolerable to some French Jews.  As Joan Wolf notes (2004), in the 1980s many Holocaust 
survivors were appalled when young French Jews used the Holocaust as a symbolic way to 
create anti-racist coalitions dedicated to combating all forms of structural marginality and 
victimization. 10  But by the early 2000s such metaphoric uses of the Holocaust had also become 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 Wolf argues for a shift from Holocaust as trauma in the 1960s and 1970s to Holocaust as 
symbol in the 1980s.  In the traumatic mode, French Jews both wanted and refused the empathy 
of others, in large part because the Holocaust was imagined as both uniquely Jewish and as 
incommensurable with any other kind of experience (Wolf 2004, 192–93).  In contrast, youth in 
the 1980s saw the Holocaust as a symbol of their structural similarity to other oppressed minority 
populations (ibid., 193).  See further Maud Mandel (2014) Chapter 6 for an account of how these 
diverse anti-racist coalitions quickly fell apart. 
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geopolitically problematic, perhaps in unprecedented ways.  At the turn of the millennium, the 
Holocaust had (once again) become a major discursive weapon in French public discourse.  The 
Holocaust as a metaphorical morality play pitting victim against aggressor, weak against strong, 
and good against bad had become a sign of and model for thinking about injustice in all sorts of 
public representations, most particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, e.g. (Morin, Naïr, and 
Sallenave 2002).  Linking Israeli actions against Palestinians and the Palestinian territories to the 
Holocaust had become a virtually everyday occurrence in French media.  Here I offer just one 
particularly controversial and searing example: France 2’s footage of the 2000 fatal shooting of 
the Palestinian child Muhammed al-Dura, a scene that was widely likened to the iconic 
Holocaust image of the Jewish boy in the Warsaw ghetto with his hands in the air.11  Few news 
reports have provoked such bitter contestation, resulting in lawsuits against the reporting 
journalist—Charles Enderlin—and multiple attempts to prove that France 2’s footage was 
doctored or manufactured, e.g. (P. Bensoussan 2003).  It will probably never be clear what 
happened in the Dura case.  Twelve years after the incident, French courts were still hearing 
defamation suits from both sides (AFP 2012).  It is, however, clear that the stakes of linking 
violence in Israel-Palestine to the Holocaust were extraordinarily high both for Jewish supporters 
of Israel and their critics.  And given how important and common it had become in French 
society to use the Holocaust as a way of thinking about power, conflict, and culpability, even 
Jewish attempts to turn the Holocaust into a kind of experiential metaphor could be a dangerous 
cultural and political tool.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 Several accounts of the case have been written from different perspectives, see further 
(Enderlin 2010; Fallows 2003; Rosenzweig 2010; Pierre-André Taguieff 2010). 
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In addition, the idea that the displacement of Jews from decolonizing Middle Eastern and 
North African contexts resonated with World War II Jewish experience was being dismantled 
through international Zionist efforts.  Such metaphors opened up the possibility that Palestinian 
exile in the wake of Israeli statehood could be likened to Jewish experiences at the hands of the 
Nazis, making the equation of Zionism with Nazism possible and potentially compelling.  
Instead, Zionist groups were reframing North African Jewish and Palestine exile as equivalent.  
In 2002, the group Justice for Jews from Arab Countries (JJAC) was formed in order to lobby for 
the official recognition of 850,000 Arab Jewish refugees, a move imagined as a prelude to 
including Arab Jewish losses in any future peace settlement.  That same year, the World Jewish 
Congress hosted a series of conferences dedicated to raising awareness of Arab Jewish 
expulsion.  In 2006, JJAC launched a world-wide campaign to register and recognize Arab 
states’ role in human rights abuses against and dispossession of Arab Jews (Rettig 2006).  And 
on November 30, 2014, Israel observed its first-ever national remembrance of Jewish expulsion 
from Arab lands (Aderet 2014).  Rather than opening up the problematic possibility of elective 
affinity between the Holocaust and other moments of violence and dispossession, these 
alternative comparisons were intended to neutralize Palestinian claims about the “right of 
return,” as well as to relativize accusations of Israeli “ethnic cleansing.”   
If both “unmoored” and metaphorical Holocausts rooted in messianic historicities were 
politically unthinkable for Jewish elites, linear accounts of the “European” Holocaust were 
perhaps increasingly intolerable to many North African Jews.  We saw the silence and 
humiliation of the Community Center audience during the “history lesson” provided by Azéroual 
and the moderator.  Twenty-something business school student, Adrien, whose parents were born 
in North Africa, explained in the mid-2000s:  
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I know I have to take precautions and everything because you can’t talk about the 
whole, but I have the impression that the Ashkenazi people feels like it was 
weakened by the war and everything, because some of their parents were deported 
and everything.  At the same time, they make others feel like they are the only 
ones who suffered from that…  And [despite] the fact that me, my grandparents 
were not deported, and other families were not deported…I find that a bit 
unjustified.  Because in a people, you suffer for others…  It’s a union.  For me, if 
an Ashkenazi’s grandparents were deported, I have even more pain for them…  
The [Shoah] concerns everyone because, from the moment it was Jews who were 
hurt, it even concerns non-Jews, but even more Jews. 
 
Or, in the less nuanced version offered by a Jewish day school parent from Algeria, “Hitler did 
not ask Jews whether they were Ashkenazi or Sephardi!  He just killed them!”   
This push-back against long-standing exclusivist, “European” Jewish narratives might 
have become more pronounced during the early 2000s because of a collective Jewish sense of 
what Algerian-born Shmuel Trigano has called the “denationalization” of French, and most 
particularly North African, Jews.  Writing in 2003, Trigano noted:  
[W]hat is really a problem is the de-nationalization of the Jewish community 
entailed by the false theory of [Jewish and Muslim] symmetry.  This implies a 
comparison between French Jews and newly arrived or recently naturalized 
immigrant populations…  [Sephardim] thus find themselves victims of a double 
betrayal because [under colonial rule] they chose France by separating 
themselves from Islam, under which they had been dominated subjects, and 
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opted for France at the independence of these countries.  One could not find a 
better way to exclude them from the nation and cheapen their citizenship 
(Trigano 2003, 15). 
 
In other words, in a context in which Jews felt like both their citizenship and nationality were 
being questioned and perhaps cheapened, being excluded from the European Jewishness 
produced by the Holocaust became even more intolerable. 
  This is where Nataf and his explicitly pedagogical historicity come in.  Over the last ten 
years, French publishers have released a flurry of books telling the “untold” or “unknown” or 
“little known” story of the Holocaust in North Africa.  These include everything from country-
specific accounts of work camps and living conditions for North African Jews during World War 
II, see for example (Allali 2014; Bel-Ange 2006; Borgel 2007; F. Gasquet 2006; Nataf 2012; 
Oliel 2005), to much more general accounts of pro-Nazi, anti-Jewish sentiment in “Arab” lands, 
see for example (G. Bensoussan 2012).	   In addition, North African Jewish experiences during 
World War II have recently become the grounds for institution-building, community center 
lecturers, educational programming, film screenings, museum exhibits, and memorialization in 
France.  Nataf’s commemoration of the Tunis rafle, as well as its growing importance in the 
French Jewish landscape, is one prominent example.  For the 60th anniversary of the round-up, 
the commemoration was paired with a museum exhibit, a colloquium held at the Sorbonne, a 
ceremony in Paris’ 4th arrondissement city hall, and Jewish press attention to Tunisian Jewish 
history, see for example (C 2002).  But the Tunis rafle is not the only such example.  In February 
2005, following France-wide commemorations of the 60th anniversary of the liberation of 
Auschwitz, the Tunisian-born medical doctor André Nahum gave a talk at a Parisian-area Jewish 
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community center entitled: “L’étrange destin de Young Perez champion du monde de boxe, Tunis 
1911-Auschwitz 1945,” [The strange destiny of Young Perez, world boxing champion, born 
1911 in Tunis and deceased 1945 in Auschwitz].  In 2006, with the aid of the Claims 
Conference—an organization dedicated to securing reparations for Holocaust victims—the 
Centre de documentation sur le judaïsme d’Afrique du Nord pendant la seconde guerre mondiale 
opened its doors.  That same year, as part of a Parisian celebration of Sephardi culture, Norbert 
Bel Ange gave a lecture at city hall in the 3rd arrondissement on his book, Quand Vichy internait 
ses soldats juifs d’Algerie, 1941-1943.  In 2010, Arte aired le Maghreb sous la croix gamée, a 
film based on Robert Satlof’s (2006) popular book Among the Righteous: lost stories from the 
Holocaust’s long reach into Arab lands, a work that argues that North Africa—like Europe—
was a place where “righteous” Arab non-Jews took serious risks in order to help save Jews from 
Nazi barbarism.  In late 2013 and early 2014, two different French Jewish organizations screened 
Antoine Casuboloi Ferro’s documentary “Les Juifs d’Afrique du Nord pendant la seconde guerre 
mondiale” and hosted discussions with SHJT President Claude Nataf.  And in 2015, for the first 
time, the Alliance Israélite Universelle’s university-level public education program—called the 
Institut Universitaire Elie Wiesel—hosted a conference cycle on North African Jews during the 
Second World War; the cycle included historians like Georges Bensoussan, who has written 
extensively (see below) on Middle Eastern and North African popular and political support for 
Nazism.   
This significant cultural activity suggests that, in the last ten years, French Jewish 
institutions have worked hard to “remind” the French public, and most particularly French Jews, 
that North Africa Jewry experienced Vichy discrimination, German occupation, and in rarer 
cases, deportation and death.  But often these reminders are not just about Vichy discrimination 
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and German occupation.  Sometimes they are an extension of the Final Solution itself to North 
Africa.12  Claude Nataf has himself embraced what could be called the “matter of time” thesis, a 
phrase I have taken from a 2002 Israeli documentary of the same name.  In the film, complex and 
sometimes contradictory accounts from historians and North African eye witnesses are used to 
argue that “the Holocaust was not just the Holocaust of Jews in Europe; it was the Holocaust of 
all Jewry” (JMT Films 2002).  Nataf’s work largely confirms such an account.  In the 2006 
preface to a Tunisian survivor’s account, Nataf wrote: “The experiences suffered by the Jews of 
Tunisia clarify the Nazi intention to annihilate the totality of the Jewish people,” adding that new 
historical work shows “that if the Nazis had won on the battlefield, they intended to kill the 
majority of the Jewish youth held in [Tunisian] camps by firing squad before moving into 
Algeria” (Borgel 2007, 19–20).  Similarly, the Francophone Jewish Tunisian website, 
Harissa.com, cites the British historian Martin Gilbert’s reinterpretation of the famous Wannsee 
Conference numbers (the Nazi estimate of the total European Jewish population slated for 
extermination).  Whereas some historians (e.g. Chouraqui 1985, 428) see the 700,000 estimate 
for unoccupied France as evidence of Nazi paranoia and delusion, Gilbert insists on the number’s 
empirical validity by suggesting that it must have included the Jews in France’s North African 
possessions (estimated at around 500,000) (Gilbert n.d., 1993).  And Georges Bensoussan (2012) 
has depicted North Africa as another Poland, with a deeply anti-Semitic population ready and 
perhaps willing to be Hitler’s executioners.  Drawing heavily on the thesis presented by Martin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 This was not simply a French Jewish effort to reframe the conversation around North African 
Jewry and the Holocaust.  Over the same period, the International Claims Conference began 
pushing to expand the definition of Holocaust survivors to include North African Jews, see 
further (Jazouani 2011; Shaked 2015; Shefler 2011).  
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Cuppers and Klaus-Michael Mallman’s in Nazi Palestine (2010), Bensoussan argues that the 
Nazi SS leader in Tunisia, Colonel Rauff, was part of a 24 man advance team charged with 
recruiting local Muslims to help exterminate Tunisian (and then North African) Jews (G. 
Bensoussan 2012, 610; Mallmann and Cuppers 2010, 123–25).  For Bensoussan, again following 
Cuppers and Mallman, long-standing popular anti-Semitism among “Arabs” all over North 
Africa combined with Nazi propaganda created the perfect conditions for just such recruitment.  
As with the messianic and linear historical accounts described above, it is the historicity 
of these new pedagogical narratives that interests me.  Many Holocaust scholars—even those 
like Daniel Goldhagen (1997) who problematically conflate Germanness with anti-Semitism—
think genocide is the historical contingency that must (somehow) be explained.  But for some 
contemporary French Jewish intellectuals, it is the absence of a Jewish genocide in North Africa 
that requires historical elucidation.  We have already seen Nataf’s insistence that but for the 
quick Allied victory in Tunisia, all Tunisian Jews would have been killed in a Shoah par balles 
[by bullets].  Bensoussan similarly suggests that the Moroccan Sultan’s desire to remain 
autonomous stoked his resistance to Vichy’s anti-Jewish laws and that Egyptians did not 
massacre Jews en masse because the leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement knew Hitler 
talked out of both sides of his mouth (G. Bensoussan 2012, 597; 622).  Robert Assaraf, another 
popular writer, comes to an entirely different conclusion from Bensoussan about the Moroccan 
Sultan’s relationship to his Jewish subjects, but nonetheless offers an identical account of a 
nearly missed Shoah.  He writes:  
If the [Germans] did not succeed [in implementing the Final Solution] in 
Morocco, it was perhaps in part because there was not enough time.  The 
necessity of not too directly attacking a Sultan committed to saving his Jewish 
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subjects, [and] the absence of favorable public opinion for extreme measures 
forced Protectorate authorities to tread softly and mark time.  As the threat 
became more and more immanent, the America debarkation saved Moroccan 
Jews from the Holocaust (Assaraf 2005, 421). 
There is precedent for these kinds of accounts, particularly given that some North African 
Jewish communities were aware of what was happening to their European co-religionists during 
the war, see further (Yablonka 2009, 97; Saraf 1988).  But while these more recent French 
accounts are styled as a “lost” or silenced history, they do not fit the standard mold of history.  
On the one hand, they are linear narratives that locate events historically and sociologically.  In 
contrast to messianic accounts, the Holocaust does refer to a specific set of historically and 
sociologically grounded events narrated in linear time.  But on the other hand, this new popular 
historiography is full of counter-factuals styled as historical truth.  It is obviously not possible to 
know if, everything else being different, Egyptians, Moroccans, and Tunisians would have 
participated in the genocide of local Jews.  These accounts thus read as thwarted teleology rather 
than as attempts to line-up necessary and sufficient causes.  In other words, it seems as if the end 
game—global Jewish destruction—is programmed into the beginning of the story.  This allows 
all Jews everywhere to have an exclusive, and yet global, relationship to that destruction.  So not 
only were all Jews once victims of Nazi genocide, all Jews in France are equally the heirs to this 
specific, unprecedented, and unrepeatable moment of racialized violence.  
This pedagogical approach may not reshape the way Parisian Jews talk about North 
Africa and the Holocaust.  Such a reshaping entails quite a bit more than simply replacing one 
historical narrative with another.  The sense of being “eaten” in a European world genocidally 
hostile to “Jews” is a complex, phenomenological experience with deep roots.  And all three of 
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these historicities—messianic, linear historical, and pedagogical—can and do coexist, albeit with 
considerable tension and contradiction.  But whether or when the pedagogical approach impacts 
everyday narratives about the past, it has significant political effects.  
Linear teleological narratives combine the expansive understanding of “Jewishness” 
posited by messianic accounts with the Eurocentric frame offered by linear accounts.  How so?  
The barely missed North African Holocaust assumes Jewish sameness across a North 
African/European divide.  In this framework, North African Jewish experiences are not 
analogous variants of the Holocaust, but part and parcel of its telos—a telos that was fortuitously 
(and highly contingently) stopped prior to its full unfolding.  This effaces the significant 
historical and sociological differences between and among all kinds of Jews in France, not just 
between “Ashkenazim” and “Sephardim,” by insisting on Jewishness itself as the most socially 
and historically significant aspect of identity.  There is no place here for Richard Marienstras’ 
emphasis on the interplay between sameness and difference among Jewish communities as the 
grounds for Jewish diasporic connections; instead, linear teleological narratives produce a 
necessarily impoverished Jewish homogeneity.   
 These narratives also situate Jewishness within the emerging framework of a “Judeo-
Christian” Europe, one that is both implicitly and explicitly juxtaposed with the “Arab” world, 
see further (Huntington 2011).  They do this in a number of complex and seemingly 
contradictory ways.  In one sense, linear teleological accounts make the whole world “Europe” 
for Holocaust-era Jews.  Public intellectuals like Nataf and Bensoussan assume that Eastern 
Europe populations are the model for understanding how “Arabs” all over North Africa and the 
Middle East would have responded to Nazi control and propaganda.  As a result, this framework 
implies that, during the Second World War, Polish and Tunisian Jews were identically positioned 
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vis-à-vis non-Jewish majorities.  But this is no longer the case.  Temporally re-grounding the 
Holocaust in a specific historical moment suggests that while Europe was anti-Semitic, it has 
since acknowledged its culpability and become more pluralist and tolerant, see further (Bunzl 
2004, 2003).  If Jews globally were victims of European history during the Second World War, 
they are now part of that history.  The same, however, cannot be said of those Arab Muslim 
contexts likened to Poland.  Turning North Africa into Poland mutes the very well-documented 
and virulent European settler anti-Semitism that existed in places like Algeria (Abitbol 1989; 
Kalman 2013), while highlighting much less well-documented and seemingly timeless Arab 
hatred of Jews.   
 This kind of characterization of “Arab Muslim” civilization dovetails with an emergent 
French literature on contemporary forms of anti-Semitism.  In contrast to mainstream French 
discourse that associates “Arabo-Muslim” anti-Semitism with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
what are seen as Israeli abuses of power, some critical public intellectuals link post-2000s anti-
Semitism with essential “Arab” or “Muslim” characteristics that long predate the creation of 
Israel.  For example, Shmuel Trigano, reflecting on the past 15 years of anti-Semitic incidents in 
Metropolitan France, has written:  
“Behind the pretext of Palestine, the religious [notably Islamic] motivations of the 
anti-Jewish violence remain misunderstood.  It would cost French elites too much 
doctrinal and psychological effort to accept this fact, after such a long period of 
denial, for it overturns their erroneous prism of interpretation.  The thesis that 
France faces an ‘imported conflict’ still reigns today—and it remains as false now 
as it was 14 years ago at the time of the Second Intifada.  We are in the same 
place (Trigano 2015). 
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Similar analyses highlighting the fundamental incompatibility between “Arab” or “Muslim” 
outlooks and those of both secular France and French Jews can be found in works about 
contemporary France by a range of French public intellectuals, see further (Sibony 2003; Pierre-
André Taguieff 2002; Trigano 2003; Weinstock 2004).  In these historical and contemporary 
analyses, “Arabs” are transformed into unrepentant anti-Semites, not just anti-Zionists.  If in the 
1930s and early 1940s, the dominated anti-colonial/pro-nationalist populations of North Africa 
were baying for Jewish blood, it is Arab post-colonial states and politics that are the direct 
inheritors of Nazi ideologies.  As a result, the real source of national and/or civilizational 
difference does not lie among Jews, or between European Jews and non-Jews, but between post-
Holocaust Europe, now expanded to include all Jews, and the “Arabs” whose present politics—
wherever they might be located—index unreformed Nazi sympathies.  As Trigano has noted: 
contemporary “Arab Muslim” attacks on Jews or “people who look Jewish” “illustrate the 
disturbingly endemic character of this anti-Semitism, which has come from a universe that has 
remained foreign to 50 years of changes in Europe and which is redolent with archaic 19th 
century images” (Trigano 2002, 1).      
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have laid out three different ways that French Jews talk about the 
Holocaust.  The messianic historicities embraced by North African Jews seeking to connect their 
identities and lived experiences in a variety of ways with all Jews; the linear, historically 
continuous narratives used to counter such attempts at negotiating North African inclusion; and 
finally, the hybrid pedagogical approach that produces a globally shared and yet temporally 
grounded Jewish Holocaust.  In outlining these three approaches to narrating the Holocaust, I 
have suggested that these fraught internal Jewish arguments are not really about what happened; 
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they are about what might even count as part of a narrative of what happened.  In other words, 
they are about what “history” itself might mean, how it might be shaped, and what it might 
include.  And because these are arguments about what might constitute a “shared” past, they are 
also debates about what the “Shoah” is and whether it actually refers to a specific set of events in 
history or to a (variously imagined) structure of history itself. 
In addition, each mode of narration both indexes and produces a particular conception of 
Jewishness, situating French Jews, in all their tremendous diversity, differently vis-à-vis each 
other and vis-à-vis other kinds of group imaginaries, particularly Frenchness and Europeanness.  
The linear, historically continuous narratives I describe are resistant to internal Jewish diversity, 
a resistance manifested either through the production of intractable internal Jewish boundaries 
(religious/secular, North African/European, Sephardi/Ashkenazi) or through the flattening of 
necessarily diverse Jewish experiences across sociological and political contexts (Wright 2015).  
These historically continuous narratives also seem to be attuned to “national” histories rooted in 
the isomorphic relationship between genealogy, culture, and territoriality.  As a result, linear 
Holocaust narratives seem quite attentive to both French and European formulations of the 
“Jewish question,” carefully positioning Jews inside both the newly “Judeo-Christian” French 
nation and post-World War II European “civilization.”  In contrast, the non-linear “messianic” 
stories, whether secular or religious, are more accommodating of empirical diversity, allowing 
for a considerable range of experiences of Jewishness united through a much more transcendent 
conception unity.  This capaciousness does, however, come with a moral price, notably the 
categorization of some forms of Jewishness as heretical and even dangerous to the Jewish social 
body.  But even these internal heretics remain first and foremost Jews.  As a result, these often 
transhistorical and transgeographical conceptions of Jewishness underwrite far greater 
	   37	  
insouciance about how French Jews are positioned vis-à-vis either French national identity or 
European civilizational belonging.13  And there is therefore less concern about how European 
non-Jews of any stripe think about contemporary incarnations of the “Jewish question.”  This 
suggests that there may be significant gaps in between the epistemologies and conceptions of 
belonging, and not just in the politics, of those who differently mobilize the Holocaust to fight, 
defend, or identify with a global Jewish community instantiated in Israel. 
These disagreements about how to talk about the Holocaust therefore suggest that French 
Jews are also arguing about what the category “Jew” means in contemporary France and Europe.  
Despite very loud instance among many French public figures that Jews are both quintessentially 
French and European,14 the disagreements and anxieties on display in North African Holocaust 
narratives tell a different story.  What does it mean to be Jewish in post-Holocaust and post-
colonial France?  Does Jewishness inherently index Frenchness?  Or Europeanness?  Or is it 
more closely tied to a different kind of social and political imaginary, one that sits uncomfortably 
with both standard anthropological and nationalist understandings of culture and belonging?  
Who gets to decide?  And what are the political, as well as social and epistemological, 
consequences of such a decision?   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 For a similar observation about Algerian Jewish conceptions of Frenchness in an entirely 
different set of circumstances, see further (Davidson 2015). 
14 I could cite numerous examples, but here I will limit myself to a striking public example.  In 
2015, the head of the most important secular French Jewish organization in France, the Conseil 
Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France [CRIF], told attendees at the annual CRIF dinner: 
“We would be less French if we were not Jewish” (Cukierman 2015).  
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Most social science of contemporary Europe does not focus on such categorical 
uncertainty.  Instead, social scientists have largely emphasized the ways in which Jewishness has 
been normalized in the post-World War II and post-colonial period as a domestic, non-
threatening, and quintessentially “European” identity, particularly in relation to “foreign” 
Muslims, see further (Benbassa 2004; Bowen 2007; Bunzl 2004, 2007; Fassin 2006; Fernando 
2014; Lindenberg 2002).15  This may be a problematic analysis for many reasons, not least 
because Jews are almost always depicted as leaving Europe, see further (Hammerschlag 2016).  
But it is also makes it hard to understand contemporary French Jewish reactions to anti-Semitism 
and Israel as anything other than cynical political ploys on the part of a fundamentally secure 
population.  The Holocaust narratives described here tell quite a different story, one in which the 
“Europeanness” of French Jews is far from assured and at the same time may not be seen by all 
Jews as either possible or desirable.  In other words, it is not clear from these stories whether and 
for whom Jewishness counts as a categorical identity, nor how it might fit into either European 
nation-states or Europe more generally.  
This categorical uncertainty points to the importance of an emerging conversation among 
French colonial historians, a conversation that is really just beginning and insists on rethinking 
French colonial history outside the “identity” categories (French, Muslim, Jewish, indigenous, 
native) that seem so self-evident from a contemporary perspective, see further (Davidson 2015, 
2012; E. Katz 2015; M. Mandel 2014; Schley 2015; Shepard 2013; Schreier 2010; Shepard 2008; 
Stein 2014).  The attention these colonial historians bring to the contingency and slipperiness of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 For a contrasting and much more skeptical take, see further (Boyarin 2009) on France and (R. 
Mandel 2008) on Germany. 
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any of these categorical positions is a reminder of the constant and always contested sociological 
work required to make difference into sameness and sameness into difference.  This is a lesson 
that social scientists—particularly anthropologists—taught historians.  Social scientists who 
work on Europe may now need a refresher course from the historians.  
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